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We consider discrete-modulation protocols for continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-
QKD) that employ a modulation constellation consisting of a finite number of coherent states and
that use a homodyne-detection receiver. We establish a security proof for collective attacks in the
asymptotic regime, and we provide a formula for an achievable secret-key rate. Previous works
established security proofs for Gaussian-modulation CV-QKD protocols or for discrete-modulation
protocols with two or three coherent states. The main constituents of our approach include approxi-
mating a complex, isotropic Gaussian probability distribution by a finite-size Gauss-Hermite constel-
lation, applying entropic continuity bounds, and leveraging previous security proofs for Gaussian-
modulation protocols. As an application of our method, we calculate secret-key rates achievable
over a pure-loss bosonic channel. Our results indicate that in the high-loss regime and for suffi-
ciently large constellation size, the achievable key rates scale optimally, i.e., proportional to the
channel’s transmissivity, and they approach the rates achieved by a Gaussian-modulation protocol
as the constellation size is increased.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows for two dis-
tant parties, often called Alice and Bob, to create a
shared secret key by employing an insecure and noisy
quantum communication channel and an authenticated
public classical communication channel [1–3]. The se-
curity is based on the physical laws of quantum me-
chanics, in contrast to conventional cryptographic proto-
cols, whose security relies on computational complexity-
theoretic assumptions.
There are two basic classes of QKD protocols that
have been considered: discrete-variable and continuous-
variable (see, e.g., [3] for a review). In discrete-
variable QKD (DV-QKD), the information is usually en-
coded in the polarization or time bin of single photons
or weak coherent states (laser-light pulses). Discrete-
variable QKD requires high-efficiency, low dark-count-
rate, single-photon detectors, which are expensive and
often need extreme cryo-cooling. In the other class
of protocols, known as continuous-variable QKD (CV-
QKD), the information is encoded in the quadrature am-
plitudes of coherent states. The transmitter modulates
the phase and/or the amplitude of laser-light pulses, and
the receiver is based on coherent detection (i.e., homo-
dyne or heterodyne detection). Near shot-noise-limited,
low-noise homodyne detection is readily realizable at
room temperature using off-the-shelf hardware, unlike
the single-photon detectors of DV-QKD. CV-QKD pro-
tocols thus possess a major advantage over DV-QKD in
terms of the cost and ease of experimental implementa-
tion.
However, one major area that DV-QKD currently pos-
sesses an advantage over CV-QKD is that the DV modu-
lation involves few levels (e.g., two polarization states of
a photon or three amplitude levels of a coherent state in
the decoy-state BB84 protocol [4–6]), which puts far less
burden on the transmitter’s modulator compared to that
of the traditional Gaussian-modulation CV-QKD proto-
col. The latter requires modulation using an infinite-size
constellation. This also makes the error correction proto-
cols far simpler for DV-QKD, along with much less over-
head for random-number generation. Another area where
DV-QKD is arguably more advanced is the availability
of quantum repeater protocols [7–11] for overcoming the
fundamental rate-vs.-loss trade-off of direct-transmission
based QKD [12–14]. However, there have been recent
advances in designs of repeaters for CV-QKD [15–17].
In the most common form of CV-QKD, one uses Gaus-
sian modulation of coherent states [18]: Alice modulates
laser-light pulses with amplitudes selected randomly from
a complex-valued Gaussian distribution with a given vari-
ance. Security proofs for this Gaussian modulation CV-
QKD protocol have been developed for arbitrary attacks,
even in the finite key-length regime [19]. Additionally, a
suite of variants of this CV-QKD protocol exist, some of
which use squeezed light modulation and two-way trans-
mission [20–28]. However, all of their asymptotic security
proofs require a Gaussian modulation. Gaussian mod-
ulation has obvious drawbacks, which include extreme
burden on the transmitter’s random number source, as
well as computationally demanding and inefficient error-
correction techniques. Furthermore, no matter how high
the extinction ratio of a practically-realizable electro-
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2optic modulator, it is impossible to sample pulse am-
plitudes from a true Gaussian distribution, on which the
security proofs rely.
Despite the fact that Gaussian modulation has made
security proofs manageable, it is important—for the prac-
tical realizability of CV-QKD—that protocols that use
a few pre-determined modulation levels (such as binary
phase and quadrature amplitude modulation) are proven
secure. Discrete-modulation CV-QKD was introduced in
[29–31], where the coherent states transmitted in each
mode are chosen according to a discrete probability dis-
tribution, and it was developed further in [32]. Discrete-
modulation CV-QKD protocols can leverage the efficient
modulation and error correction, and low-overhead ran-
dom number generation that DV-QKD enjoys, while re-
taining the ease of implementation of homodyne detec-
tion of CV-QKD.
Several discrete-modulation protocols have already
been considered [32–35], and security proofs have been
developed in the asymptotic regime, i.e., in the limit of
a large number of uses of the quantum channel, hence
generating a large-length key (at a given key-bits per
channel-use rate). Ref. [32] considered a protocol with
binary-phase shift-keying of coherent states along with
homodyne detection. However, the secure key rate es-
tablished there is more than an order of magnitude
lower than that which can be achieved with Gaussian
modulation. Motivated by [32], Ref. [33] considered
ternary-phase shift-keying modulation with homodyne
detection, which led to an improvement in the secure
key rates, but the resulting secret-key rates are still far
from the key rates achievable with Gaussian modulation.
Refs. [34, 35] established security for discrete-modulation
protocols against particular collective attacks that corre-
spond to linear bosonic channels.
This brings us to the long-standing open problem of
proving security of a general M -ary discrete-modulation
CV-QKD protocol, for M beyond a minimum thresh-
old value, with the feature that the achievable key rate
approaches that of Gaussian modulation as M goes to
infinity. Such a result is of significant value for the prac-
tical usability of CV-QKD. In this paper, we accomplish
the aforesaid for security against collective attacks. Es-
tablishing a security proof and key-rate lower bounds for
discrete modulation CV-QKD protocols with a finite key
length is left open for future work. Our proof eliminates
the need to consider protocols based on Gaussian modu-
lation in order to have asymptotic security in CV-QKD,
with the ability of the user to determine the size of the
modulation alphabet based on how close one desires the
key rates to be to the Gaussian modulation protocol. In
addition, our numerical evaluation of achievable key rates
over a pure-loss bosonic channel suggests that, for suffi-
ciently large constellation size, the achievable key rates
are proportional to the channel’s transmissivity, which is
known to be the optimal rate-vs.-loss scaling achievable
with any QKD protocol, CV or DV [12]. To establish
these results, we make use of two important recent the-
oretical advances: the approximation of Gaussian distri-
butions with discrete ones for communication [36, 37],
especially in the context of bosonic Gaussian states [37],
and an entropic continuity bound from [38] for energy-
bounded bosonic states. The idea of approximating a
Gaussian modulation with a discrete one for CV-QKD
was proposed in [39], but this work did not provide a se-
curity proof for CV-QKD with discrete modulation. One
of the main tools, beyond the approaches considered in
[39] and which allows us to establish a security proof,
is the entropic continuity bound from [38]. We also de-
velop methods for using the parameters observed in a
discrete-modulation CV-QKD protocol to bound Eve’s
Holevo information.
This paper is organized as follows: we introduce
discrete-modulation CV-QKD in Section II, followed by
Section III’s detailed list of our assumptions on the col-
lective attack of Eve. We give our security proof in Sec-
tion IV, and we discuss details of channel estimation in
Section V. We then showcase, in Section VI, the secure
key rates that our approach lead to when the protocol is
conducted over a pure-loss bosonic channel. We end with
open questions and future directions in Section VII.
II. PROTOCOL
We begin by outlining the steps of a phase-
symmetrized discrete-modulation CV-QKD protocol
based on m2 coherent states and homodyne detection,
where m ∈ N. Let X be a random variable with real-
izations x ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m2} and fix αx ∈ C for all x. Let
r(x) be the probability associated with the realization x.
The steps of the protocol are as follows:
1. Alice prepares the coherent state |αx〉 with proba-
bility r(x). She records the value of x in the vari-
able xj , where j ∈ {1, . . . , n} refers to the transmis-
sion round. She also records the value
√
2 Re{αx}
in the variable qj . Exact expressions for αx and
r(x) that we use in the protocol are given in Sec-
tion V.
2. Alice then picks a phase φj ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} uni-
formly at random, applies it to her channel input
mode as the unitary e−inˆφj , which is physically re-
alized by a phase shifter. The resulting state is then
e−inˆφj |αx〉 =
∣∣αxe−iφj〉, which she transmits over
the unknown and insecure quantum communication
channel N to Bob. At the same time, she commu-
nicates the choice φj to Bob over a public authenti-
cated classical channel and then she locally discards
or forgets the choice of φj . The insecure quantum
channel N can be controlled by an eavesdropper
Eve. Our assumptions on the insecure quantum
channel N are stated in Section III.
3. Upon receiving the output of the quantum chan-
nel, namely, the state N (e−inˆφj |αx〉〈αx|einˆφj ), as
3well as the classical choice of φj from the public
authenticated classical channel, Bob applies the re-
verse phase as the inverse unitary einˆφj , and then
locally discards or forgets the value of φj . The re-
sulting state is then as follows:
N (|αx〉〈αx|), (1)
where the phase-symmetrized channel N is defined
as
N (ρ) ≡ 1
4
3∑
k=0
U(k)†N (U(k)ρU(k)†)U(k), (2)
with U(k) = e−inˆpik/2. The phase symmetrization
of the channel N is helpful in reducing the number
of parameters that need to be estimated during the
channel estimation part of the protocol, as we ex-
plain in Section V.
4. Bob then performs position-quadrature or real-
quadrature homodyne detection on the state
N (|αx〉〈αx|) and records the result in the variable
yj [40].
5. Steps 1-4 are repeated n times, for n a large positive
integer, leading to the sequence {qj}nj=1, known to
Alice, and the sequence {yj}nj=1, known to Bob.
6. A constant fraction δ of the rounds are used for
channel estimation (or parameter estimation), for
δ ∈ (0, 1) a small number. That is, for these δn
rounds, the following parameters are calculated:
γ11 ≡ 1
δn
δn∑
j=1
(qj − q)2, (3)
γ12 ≡ 1
δn
δn∑
j=1
(qj − q)(yj − y), (4)
γ22 ≡ 1
δn
δn∑
j=1
(yj − y)2, (5)
where
q ≡ 1
δn
δn∑
j=1
qj , y ≡ 1
δn
δn∑
j=1
yj . (6)
Clearly, the parameter γ11 can be calculated from
Alice’s data alone, γ22 can be calculated from Bob’s
data alone, but it is necessary to calculate γ12 from
both Alice and Bob’s data, and so it is necessary for
Bob to share the yj values of these δn rounds with
Alice over a public authenticated classical chan-
nel. Furthermore, the public authenticated clas-
sical channel is used for Alice and Bob to share the
values of γ11, γ12, and γ22 with each other. The
data xj , qj , and yj for these δn channel estimation
rounds are then discarded. A detailed analysis of
the channel estimation part of the protocol is given
in Section V.
7. The remaining xj and yj data are used for final key
generation. The final key-generation protocol in-
cludes reverse reconciliation, error correction, and
privacy amplification (see [3] for a review).
III. ASSUMPTIONS ON THE INSECURE
QUANTUM COMMUNICATION CHANNEL
In this section, we outline the various assumptions that
we make on the insecure quantum communication chan-
nel:
1. Each Alice-to-Bob transmission is assumed to take
place over independent identical uses of a quantum
channel N , which is unknown to Alice and Bob
at the beginning of the protocol. We assume that
any deviation of N from the identity map is at-
tributed to the most general adversarial action by
Eve. Even though Eve’s action—which appears as
a noisy quantum channel N to Alice and Bob—
remains the same for each transmission, she is al-
lowed to make arbitrary collective measurements
on her quantum system at the end of the protocol.
See below for a mathematical description. This sce-
nario is referred to as a collective attack.
2. The channel is described mathematically as an
isometric quantum channel UA→BE , meaning
that there exists an isometry UA→BE , satisfying
[UA→BE ]†UA→BE = IA, such that
UA→BE(ρA) ≡ UA→BE ρA (UA→BE)† (7)
for all input density operators ρA. The systems
A, B, and E are described by separable Hilbert
spaces HA, HB , and HE , respectively. The system
A corresponds to a single bosonic mode, and sys-
tem B does also. In particular, the channel can
accept coherent states at the input A and is such
that the receiver can perform homodyne detection
on the system B. The system A is accessible to
the sender Alice, the system B is accessible to the
receiver Bob, and the system E is in possession of
the eavesdropper Eve.
3. The reduced channel from Alice to Bob is given by
NA→B(ρA) ≡ TrE [UA→BE(ρA)], (8)
and this channelNA→B is what is used in the proto-
col description in Section II. We assume that if the
mean photon number of the input state ρA is finite,
then the mean photon number of the output state
NA→B(ρA) is finite. That is, Tr[nˆNA→B(ρA)] <∞
if Tr[nˆρA] < ∞. Furthermore, we assume that if
the variance of the photon number of the input
state ρA is finite, then the variance of the pho-
ton number of the output state NA→B(ρA) is fi-
nite. This implies that Tr[nˆ2NA→B(ρA)] < ∞ if
Tr[nˆ2ρA] <∞.
44. Finally, we assume that if the mean photon num-
ber of the input state ρA is finite, then the mean
energy of Eve’s state TrB [UA→BE(ρA)] is finite,
where the mean energy is computed with respect to
a physically reasonable Hamiltonian HE that sat-
isfies the Gibbs hypothesis [41–43], meaning that
Tr[e−βHE ] < ∞ for all β > 0 and has its ground-
state energy equal to zero. For example, if Eve’s
system E of the state TrB [UA→BE(ρA)] consists of
several bosonic modes E1, . . . , Ek, then HE could
be taken as the total photon number operator
nˆ1 + · · ·+ nˆk for all of the k modes.
We note that an immediate consequence of the
bounded mean photon number assumption in part three
above, by applying the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, is the
following: If Alice inputs a state ρA with finite mean vec-
tor [〈qˆ〉ρ, 〈pˆ〉ρ], then the output mean vector for the state
of system B is finite. If the input state ρA has a finite
covariance matrix with entries given by[
2〈qˆ20〉ρ 〈qˆ0pˆ0 + pˆ0qˆ0〉ρ
〈qˆ0pˆ0 + pˆ0qˆ0〉ρ 2〈pˆ20〉ρ
]
, (9)
where qˆ0 ≡ qˆ−〈qˆ〉ρ and pˆ0 ≡ pˆ−〈pˆ〉ρ, then the covariance
matrix of the output state NA→B(ρA) is finite.
IV. SECRET-KEY RATE LOWER BOUND
The asymptotic secret-key rate K is bounded from be-
low by the Devetak-Winter formula [44, 45] as
K ≥ I(X;Y )− sup
UA→BE∈S
I(Y ;E). (10)
In the above inequality, the Shannon mutual informa-
tion between Alice’s variable X and Bob’s variable Y
is denoted by I(X;Y ), and the Holevo information be-
tween Bob’s variable Y and Eve’s quantum system E is
denoted by I(Y ;E). We suppose that the quantum chan-
nel connecting Alice to Bob is not known, satisfies the as-
sumptions given in Section III, and can only be partially
estimated from X and the measurement outcomes Y on
Bob’s side, as we discuss in Section V. This lack of knowl-
edge is an advantage to Eve. Therefore, the inequality in
(10) features an optimization of the Holevo information
I(Y ;E) over all isometric quantum channels UA→BE of
Eve that are compatible with Alice’s and Bob’s data. Let
S be the set of channels that are consistent with the mea-
surement data. We discuss the precise meaning of this
statement in Section V. We also suppose that reverse rec-
onciliation [46] is being used in the key-generation proto-
col, in which the public classical communication is from
Bob to Alice, and this accounts for Bob’s variable Y ap-
pearing in the I(Y ;E) term in (10).
To calculate the lower bound in (10), we first need
to calculate the Shannon mutual information I(X;Y ),
which can be easily obtained from the observed data of
Alice and Bob. The main difficulty is then to perform
the optimization over the isometric quantum channels
UA→BE of Eve and to bound the Holevo information
I(Y ;E) from above. Doing so is the main bottleneck
for many security proofs in quantum key distribution.
For protocols involving Gaussian modulation of coher-
ent states, the aforementioned problem was solved in
[47, 48], with [47] relying on the techniques of [49]. The
optimal attack by Eve for such protocols was proved to
be a Gaussian attack, which considerably simplifies the
security analysis. However, once we consider discrete-
modulation protocols, the optimal attack by Eve is no
longer known, and is unlikely to be Gaussian. To ad-
dress this problem, novel techniques are required.
In this paper, we provide a security proof for the proto-
col described in Section II by employing various existing
tools: the approximation of Gaussian distributions with
discrete ones [36, 37], an entropic continuity bound from
[38], and the optimality of Gaussian attacks for Gaussian
modulation of coherent states [47, 48]. The approach that
we employ in this paper is rather intuitive: we approxi-
mate the Gaussian distribution with a discrete distribu-
tion and bound the error introduced due to this approx-
imation in trace norm, by employing the techniques of
[36, 37]. Then, we expect Eve’s Holevo information due
to this approximation to be close to Eve’s Holevo infor-
mation resulting from a Gaussian-modulated protocol,
with the absolute value of the difference being a function
of the error introduced in the approximation.
We now discuss this approach in detail. First, consider
a key-generation protocol that employs coherent states
with Gaussian modulation. The expected density opera-
tor for Alice’s transmitted state is a thermal state θ(NS)
with mean photon number NS ≥ 0:
θ(NS) ≡ 1
NS + 1
∞∑
n=0
(
NS
NS + 1
)n
|n〉〈n|. (11)
The P -function of the thermal state θ(NS) is a circu-
larly symmetric complex Gaussian [50]. Following the
approach of [37], we can approximate the real and imag-
inary parts of the circularly symmetric Gaussian by the
various constellations considered in [36]: Gauss-Hermite,
random walk, equilattice, and quantile. The type of con-
stellation fixes |αx〉 and r(x). In this paper, we focus
exclusively on the Gauss-Hermite constellation. It is pos-
sible to consider other constellations and obtain security
proofs for these other constellations using the techniques
described below. We obtain the error introduced by this
approximation, by employing bounds from [37], and then
we apply an entropic continuity bound from [38] to obtain
an upper bound on Eve’s Holevo information I(Y ;E).
We now discuss our security proof for discrete-
modulation protocols of the form presented in Section II.
Suppose that Alice employs the following discrete-
modulation ensemble of coherent states:
{r(x), |αx〉}m2x=1, (12)
5with expected density operator:
ρ ≡
m2∑
x=1
r(x)|αx〉〈αx|. (13)
Then depending on the constellation size m2 and the
mean photon number NS of the thermal state being ap-
proximated, we obtain the following bound on the nor-
malized trace distance:
1
2
‖ρ− θ(NS)‖1 ≤ ε(m,NS), (14)
where θ(NS) is a thermal state of mean photon number
NS and ε(m,NS) is the approximation error, for which
we determine an explicit characterization later in (76),
by employing the techniques of [37].
The secret-key rate with reverse reconciliation is given
by
βI(X;Y )− I(Y ;E), (15)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency [51] and the mu-
tual information quantities are computed with respect to
the following ensemble:
{r(x, y), ρx,yE }x,y, (16)
where
r(x, y) ≡ r(x)r(y|x), (17)
r(y|x) ≡ Tr{(ΛyB ⊗ IE)UA→BE(|αx〉〈αx|A)}, (18)
ρx,yE ≡
1
r(y|x) TrB{(Λ
y
B ⊗ IE)UA→BE(|αx〉〈αx|A)},
(19)
with {Λy}y denoting Bob’s POVM and UA→BE the iso-
metric channel satisfying the assumptions of Section III
and corresponding to the collective attack of Eve. Since
we do not know what collective attack Eve will employ,
we minimize the secret-key rate with respect to all col-
lective attacks that are consistent with the measurement
data observed by Alice and Bob, i.e., with respect to all
isometric channels UA→BE satisfying the assumptions of
Section III and in the set S. It is possible to estimate
the Shannon mutual information I(X;Y ) from the mea-
surement data of Alice and Bob, but we are left with the
following optimization problem for Eve’s Holevo informa-
tion:
sup
UA→BE∈S
I(Y ;E)Eρ , (20)
where the optimization is with respect to all collective
attacks of Eve consistent with the measurement data of
Alice and Bob, and the subscript notation Eρ indicates
that the Holevo information I(Y ;E) between Bob’s mea-
surement outcome and Eve’s quantum system is being
computed with respect to the following ensemble:
Eρ ≡ {r(y), ρyE}, (21)
where
r(y) ≡
∑
x
r(x, y), (22)
ρyE ≡
∑
x
r(x|y)ρx,yE
=
∑
x
r(x|y)
r(y|x) TrB{(Λ
y
B ⊗ IE)UA→BE(|αx〉〈αx|A)}
=
1
r(y)
TrB{(ΛyB ⊗ IE)UA→BE(ρA)}. (23)
From the data processing inequality for trace distance
(under the action of the isometric channel UA→BE and
Bob’s measurement channel), we find that
ε ≥ 1
2
‖ρ− θ(NS)‖1 (24)
≥ 1
2
∫
dy
∥∥r(y)ρyE − rG(y)θyE(NS)∥∥1 , (25)
where
rG(y) ≡ Tr{(ΛyB ⊗ IE)UA→BE(θ(NS))}, (26)
θyE(NS) ≡
1
rG(y)
TrB{(ΛyB ⊗ IE)UA→BE(θ(NS))}. (27)
We then define the following ensemble as that which
would arise had Alice employed a Gaussian modulation
at the channel input:
Eθ = {rG(y), θyE}. (28)
At this point, we invoke the fourth assumption from
Section III: if the mean energy of the input state to the
channel TrB ◦UA→BE is fixed at some finite mean pho-
ton number κ ∈ [0,∞), then the mean energy of the
output state is no larger than κ′(κ) ∈ [0,∞). Supposing
that HE is the Hamiltonian for Eve’s system E satisfying
the properties stated in the fourth assumption from Sec-
tion III, by applying the continuity bound given in [38,
Proposition 27], we find that
I(Y ;E)Eρ ≤ I(Y ;E)Eθ + f(ε, P ), (29)
where P is an upper bound on the mean energy of the
states TrB ◦UA→BE(ρA) and TrB ◦UA→BE(θ(NS)) and
f(ε, P ) is a function of ε and P , given in [38], with the
property that
lim
ε→0
f(ε, P ) = 0. (30)
In particular, the function f(ε, P ) is given by
f(ε, P ) ≡ ε (2t+ rε(t))S(θE(P/εt))
+ 2g(εrε(t)) + 2h(εt), (31)
for any t ∈ (0, 12ε ], where
rε(t) ≡ (1 + t/2)/(1− εt), (32)
6g(x) ≡ (x+ 1) log2(x+ 1)− x log2(x), (33)
h(x) ≡ −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x), (34)
and S(θE(P/εt)) is the entropy of a thermal state
θE(P/εt) of Eve’s system with mean energy P/εt. Due
to this uniform bound, we can then apply suprema to
find that
sup
UA→BE∈S
I(Y ;E)Eρ ≤ supUA→BE∈S
I(Y ;E)Eθ + f(ε, P ),
(35)
with the optimizations again taken with respect to col-
lective attacks of Eve consistent with the measurement
data of Alice and Bob. The lower bound on the key rate
is then given as
K ≥ I(X;Y )− sup
UA→BE∈S
I(Y ;E)Eθ − f(ε, P ). (36)
The Shannon mutual information between X and Y ,
i.e., the term I(X;Y ), can be calculated from the ob-
served data, as mentioned previously. The term f(ε, P ),
introduced due to the continuity of Holevo informa-
tion, can be estimated from (31). Obtaining an up-
per bound on the remaining term, the Holevo informa-
tion supUA→BE∈S I(Y ;E)Eθ , still requires further devel-
opment, which we detail in the next section.
V. CHANNEL ESTIMATION
The main objective of this section is to obtain an
upper bound on the remaining term, the Holevo infor-
mation supUA→BE∈S I(Y ;E)Eθ . The approach that we
take to obtain an upper bound can be divided into three
parts: estimation of parameters from the actual proto-
col described in Section II, using these to bound the
parameters that would result if a Gaussian-modulation
protocol had been employed instead, and finally using
these last estimates to bound the Holevo information
supUA→BE∈S I(Y ;E)Eθ from above.
A. Estimation of parameters from the actual
discrete-modulation protocol
Alice and Bob calculate the parameters γ11, γ12, and
γ22 given in (3)–(5) of the sixth step of the protocol, as
described in Section II. Then the set S discussed in Sec-
tion IV consists of all of the isometric channels UNA→BE
that are consistent with the calculated values of γ11, γ12,
and γ22. In this way, Alice and Bob characterize the
attack by Eve.
Since we are operating in the asymptotic regime, such
that the number n of rounds is large, it follows that the
number δn of channel estimation rounds is also large.
Additionally, since Eve is employing a collective attack
and the protocol has an i.i.d. structure, it follows that
the parameters γ11, γ12, and γ22 are given exactly as the
expectation of particular random variables.
To determine these random variables, we now give ex-
act expressions for the constellation {αx}m2x=1 and distri-
bution rX(x) that are used in the protocol. We begin by
recalling the Gauss-Hermite approximation to the nor-
mal distribution with zero mean and unit variance, which
reproduces the first 2m−1 moments of the Gaussian dis-
tribution [52, Section 3.6]. Let Hm be the mth Hermite
polynomial, and let Lm be a random variable with m
realizations lwm, with probability distribution given by
rLm(lwm), where w ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Then, as defined
in [36], the values lwm are set to the roots of the Her-
mite polynomial Hm, and the probability distribution
rLm(lwm) is defined as
rLm(lwm) ≡
(m− 1)!
mH2m−1(lwm)
. (37)
The P -function of a thermal state with mean photon
number NS is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian
[50]. Following [37], we approximate the real and imag-
inary parts of the thermal-state P -function individually
by the constellation described above. Specifically, we
choose qwm for w ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that the sequence
{qwm/
√
NS}w is equal to the zeros of the Hermite poly-
nomial Hm, and we choose ptm for t ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such
that the sequence {ptm/
√
NS}t is equal to the zeros of
the Hermite polynomial Hm. Then the constellation is
given by the following distribution:
rX(x) = rX(αx) (38)
= rX
(
qwm + iptm√
2
)
(39)
= rLm
(
qwm√
NS
)
rLm
(
ptm√
NS
)
(40)
≡ rQA(qwm) rPA(ptm), (41)
where x = (w, t) ∈ {1, . . . ,m} × {1, . . . ,m}. The factor√
NS is a scaling factor incorporated so that the mean
photon number of the expected density operator for the
resulting constellation is equal to the mean photon num-
ber of the thermal state θ(NS).
Let QA denote the discrete random variable with re-
alizations qA ∈ R, taking values qwm and having a prob-
ability distribution as detailed above. Let QB denote
the random variable associated to Bob’s homodyne mea-
surement outcome of the position-quadrature operator,
taking values in R. Then, for characterizing the isomet-
ric channels UA→BE in S, Alice and Bob calculate the
parameters γ11, γ12, and γ22 from their data. Due to the
fact that we are operating in the asymptotic regime (with
no finite-size statistical effects), the following equalities
hold
γ11 = E
[
(QA − E[QA])2
]
, (42)
γ12 = E [(QA − E[QA])(QB − E[QB ])] , (43)
γ22 = E
[
(QB − E[QB ])2
]
. (44)
7As stated previously, Alice estimates γ11 from her
preparation data, while Bob estimates γ22 from his mea-
surement data. Alice calculates γ12 from the data that is
publicly published by Bob. Then S is the set of isometric
channels UA→BE that fulfill the constraints in Section III
and produce the observed values of γ12 and γ22. As a con-
sequence, Alice and Bob deduce that the attack by Eve
yields the observed values of γ22 and γ12. In this way,
they are able to restrict the possible attacks that could
have been performed by Eve.
B. Estimation of parameters for a hypothetical
Gaussian-modulation protocol
Now notice that the remaining Holevo information
supUA→BE∈S I(Y ;E)Eθ from (36) that we want to bound
from above is calculated for a thermal state θ(NS) sent
over an isometric channel UA→BE in the set S and Bob
performing homodyne detection of the position quadra-
ture. Therefore, we want to obtain an estimate of the
parameters γG11, γ
G
12, and γ
G
22, which are defined analo-
gously to (42)–(44), but with the initial random variable
QA replaced by a Gaussian random variable with mean
zero and variance equal to NS . The parameters γ
G
11, γ
G
12,
and γG22 are those that would be observed in a Gaussian
modulation protocol when the average channel input of
Alice is a thermal state θ(NS) instead of ρ.
In order to bound the values of the parameters that
would be obtained in a Gaussian-modulation protocol
with Eve’s attack taken from the set S, we can em-
ploy the parameters that are observed in the discrete-
modulation protocol. Before we do so, let us recall the
definition of the χ2 divergence of two states ρ and σ as
χ2(ρ, σ) ≡ Tr[(ρσ−1/2)2] − 1 [53]. Then we have the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 Let ρ =
∑
x rX(x) |αx〉〈αx|, where
αx =
qA + ipA√
2
, (45)
rX(x) = rQA(qA) rPA(pA), (46)
θNS =
∫
dx rG(x) |αx〉〈αx| , (47)
where rG(x) is the P -function for a thermal state with
mean photon number NS. If
√
χ2(ρ, θ(NS)) ≤ ε2 and
Eve’s attack UNA→BE fulfills the constraints in Section III,
then,
γ11 = γ
G
11, (48)
|γ22 − γG22| ≤ ε1, (49)
|γ12 − γG12| ≤ ε2, (50)
where
ε1 = ε · (1 + c1) ·
√
E [(QB − E[QB ])4], (51)
ε2 = ε · (1 + c2) ·
√
E [(QA − E[QA])2(QB − E[QB ])2],
(52)
for some constants c1, c2 > 0.
The proof relies mainly on the properties of trace
distance, invoking the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality and
the assumption that the fourth moment of the chan-
nel output is bounded. For details, please refer to Ap-
pendix A. By invoking Proposition 1, we conclude that
γG22 ∈ [γ22 − ε1, γ22 + ε1], and γG12 ∈ [γ12 − ε2, γ12 + ε2],
where ε1 and ε2 are defined above.
Now, consider the following scenario corresponding to
an entanglement-based (EB) QKD protocol: Alice pre-
pares a two-mode squeezed vacuum state ψ(n¯)RA =
|ψ(n¯)〉〈ψ(n¯)|RA where
|ψ(n¯)〉RA ≡ 1√
n¯+ 1
∞∑
n=0
√(
n¯
n¯+ 1
)n
|n〉R |n〉A , (53)
with n¯ ≥ 0. She applies a phase e−inˆpik/2 to her channel
input mode A, with k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} selected uniformly
at random, and she sends the system A to Bob over an
isometric channel UNA→BE selected from the set S. She
also communicates k to Bob over an authenticated pub-
lic classical channel. Bob then applies the inverse phase
e−inˆpik/2. Both Alice and Bob then discard the value of
k. Let ρRB denote the state shared by Alice and Bob
at the end, so that the reduced channel NA→B has been
phase symmetrized due to the protocol above and with
NA→B defined as in (2):
ρRB ≡ NA→B(ψ(n¯)RA). (54)
Due to the symmetries of the two-mode squeezed vacuum
state ψ(n¯)RA as well as those of the phase-symmetrized
channel NA→B , it follows that the covariance matrix of
the state ρRB has the following form:[
γEB11 I2 γEB12 R(θ)
γEB12 R(θ) γ
EB
22 I2
]
, (55)
where γEB11 , γ
EB
12 , γ
EB
22 ∈ R such that the above is a legit-
imate quantum covariance matrix [54], the matrix I2 is
the 2× 2 identity matrix, and
R(θ) ≡
[
cos(θ) sin(θ)
sin(θ) − cos(θ)
]
, (56)
is a rotation matrix. See Appendix B for a proof of this
claim. In what follows, we assume that θ = 0, due to
the fact that doing so simplifies the protocol, as well as
reducing the number of parameters that need to be esti-
mated, and it furthermore does not lead to an increase in
Eve’s Holevo information, as discussed in [19]. Alice then
performs a heterodyne measurement on mode R and Bob
performs a homodyne measurement on mode B. As men-
tioned above, this is the entanglement-based (EB) ver-
sion of the Gaussian-modulated prepare-measure (PM)
protocol with the attacks by Eve constrained to the set S.
8Now, we want to deduce the parameters γEB11 , γ
EB
12 , γ
EB
22
observed in the EB protocol from the parameters
γG11, γ
G
12, γ
G
22 observed in the PM version of the Gaussian
modulation protocol. As is common in the CV-QKD lit-
erature, we consider the EB protocol because it is helpful
in analyzing the Holevo information I(Y ;E) that results
in the prepare-measure (PM) protocol. The “PM to EB”
mapping of the parameters is well known in the literature
[55] and is given as follows:
γEB11 = γ
G
11 + 1 = γ11 + 1, (57)
γEB22 = γ
G
22 ∈ [γ22 − ε1, γ22 + ε1] , (58)
γEB12 =
√
γ11 + 2
γ11
γG12
∈
[√
γ11 + 2
γ11
(γ12 − ε2),
√
γ11 + 2
γ11
(γ12 + ε2)
]
.
(59)
Let Σ denote the set of quantum states ρRB that have
covariance matrix of the following form:[
γEB11 I2 γEB12 σZ
γEB12 σZ γ
EB
22 I2
]
. (60)
C. Upper bound on Eve’s Holevo information
By applying purification techniques of quantum infor-
mation theory, the following equality holds
I(Y ;E)Eθ = H(RB)ρ −H(R|Y ){p(y),ρy}y , (61)
for ρRB the state in (54) and {p(y), ρyR}y the en-
semble resulting from Bob performing a position-
quadrature homodyne detection on the state
ρRB . As a consequence, the task of obtaining
an upper bound on supUA→BE∈S I(Y ;E)Eθ can
be accomplished by obtaining an upper bound on
supρRB∈Σ
(
H(RB)ρ −H(R|Y ){p(y),ρy}y
)
.
We then invoke the extremality of Gaussian states
[47, 49], from which we infer that the Holevo informa-
tion is optimized by a Gaussian state ρGRB having the
same covariance matrix as ρRB . Therefore, we obtain
the following:
sup
ρRB∈Σ
(
H(RB)ρ −H(R|Y ){p(y),ρy}
)
= sup
ρGRB∈Σ
(
H(RB)ρG −H(R|Y ){pG(y),ρy,G}
)
, (62)
where {pG(y), ρy,GR } is the ensemble obtained if Bob per-
forms a homodyne measurement on mode B of ρGRB .
Then, Eve’s Holevo information can be calculated as
follows:
H(RB)ρG −H(R|Y ){pG(y),ρy,G}
= g(ν1) + g(ν2)− g(ν3), (63)
where the function g(·) is defined in (33), ν1 and ν2 are
the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix in
(60), and ν3 = γ
EB
11
(
γ11 − (γ
EB
12 )
2
γEB22 +1
)
. Numerical checks,
similar to those performed and stated in [19], reveal that
the Holevo information is a monotonically decreasing
function of γEB12 , and a monotonically increasing function
of γEB11 and γ
EB
22 . Intuitively, the correlations between
Alice and Bob are quantified by γEB12 , so that increas-
ing this parameter decreases Eve’s Holevo information.
Therefore, we conclude that the Holevo information is
no larger than that achieved by a Gaussian state ρRB
that has a covariance matrix as follows: (γ11 + 1)I √γ11+2γ11 (γ12 − ε2)σZ√
γ11+2
γ11
(γ12 − ε2)σZ (γ22 + ε1)I
 . (64)
With this, we conclude our goal of obtaining an upper
bound on the remaining term supUA→BE∈S I(Y ;E)Eθ .
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS FOR A PURE-LOSS
BOSONIC CHANNEL
We now proceed with calculating the various terms
in (36) for a Gauss-Hermite constellation of size m2
and for a pure-loss bosonic channel of transmissivity
η ∈ [0, 1]. This allows for determining the performance
of the discrete-modulation CV-QKD protocol when the
underlying channel is a pure-loss channel (however, keep
in mind that Alice and Bob are not aware of this when
executing the protocol).
The first term that we need to calculate is the Shan-
non mutual information I(X;Y ). Here, X is a random
variable that encodes the choice of coherent state, and Y
is the random variable that is associated with the mea-
surement result. The Wigner function associated with
the coherent state |αx〉 subjected to a pure-loss channel
with transmissivity η is given as
Wαxy,p =
1
pi
exp
{
− |z −√ηαx|2
}
, (65)
where z = qB + ipB , with the real part qB correspond-
ing to the position-quadrature phase-space variable, and
the imaginary part pB corresponding to the momentum-
quadrature phase-space variable. Bob performs homo-
dyne detection with respect to the qB quadrature, which
provides the raw data for key generation. Then the var-
ious probability distributions are given as
rX(x) = QNS ,m(αx), (66)
rY |X(qB |x) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dpB W
αx
qB ,pB , (67)
rY (qB) =
∑
x
rX(x)rY |X(qB |x). (68)
With this information in hand, it is easy to calculate
I(X;Y ) = H(Y )r −H(Y |X)r.
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FIG. 1. In this figure, we plot the lower bounds on the key rate for various constellation size m2 of the discrete-modulation
protocol considered in Section II. The top line is an upper bound from [13, 14], which bounds the secret-key rate of any
repeaterless quantum key distribution protocol conducted over a pure-loss bosonic channel.
The second term that we need to calculate is the
Holevo information supUA→BE∈S I(Y ;E)Eθ for a key-
generation protocol that uses Gaussian-modulation of
coherent states and homodyne detection. To this end,
we need to calculate the parameters γ11, γ22, and γ12
for the discrete-modulation protocol in order to obtain
the covariance matrix in (64). These can be calculated
numerically. However, note that θ(NS) and ρ have the
same covariance matrix, due to the second moment of the
Gauss-Hermite approximation and Gaussian distribution
being the same. Since we are considering the underlying
channel as a pure-loss channel, we can calculate the pa-
rameters γ22 and γ12 that would be observed by Alice
and Bob during the protocol. To do so, we follow the
calculation given in detail in Section 7 of [55].
When applying Proposition 1, it is necessary to make
a choice for the parameters c1 and c2. In our example
considered here, we take the conservative choice of c1 =
c2 = 100. Let us emphasize that the interpretation of
this choice is that the parameters
√
E [(QB − E[QB ])4]
and
√
E [(QA − E[QA])2(QB − E[QB ])2] that would be
observed in a hypothetical Gaussian modulation protocol
are no larger than 100 times those observed in the discrete
modulation protocol. One could certainly criticize this
choice and demand that higher values of c1 and c2 be
chosen. However, we note that it is always possible for
Alice and Bob to overcome more conservative choices and
achieve the same secret key rates simply by taking the
constellation size to be higher than that considered in
our example.
Next, we have to calculate the third term, which is
the error introduced in the Holevo information I(Y ;E)
and denoted by f(ε,N ′S) in (36). To this end, we first
calculate the approximation error ε defined in (14). Fol-
lowing [37], we use the χ2-distance, defined as χ2(ρ, σ) ≡
Tr[(ρσ−1/2)2]− 1, and we employ the bound ‖ρ− σ‖21 ≤
χ2(ρ, σ), which follows from Lemma 5 of [53] with k =
1/2.
Let us denote an additive white Gaussian noise channel
with signal to noise ratio s by Ws. The action of Ws is
defined as Ws(Z) =
√
sZ + G, where G is a normally
distributed random variable with unit variance. Then,
for Z ∼ N (0, 1) with distribution PZ , a random variable
Z ′m with distribution PZm as given in (37), Y = Ws(Z),
and Y ′m = Ws(Z
′
m), the χ
2 distance is given as
χ2
(
PY ′m , PY
)
= 2κ2
∑
k≥m
(
s
1 + s
)2k
(69)
= 2κ2
(1 + s)2
1 + 2s
(
s
1 + s
)2m
, (70)
with 2κ2 ≈ 2.36 [36].
Let
ρm =
m2∑
x=1
QNS ,m(αx) |αx〉〈αx| , (71)
and θNS be a thermal state of mean photon number NS .
Then
χ2(ρm, θNS ) =
(
1 + χ2(PYm , PY )
)2 − 1, (72)
= (1 + τ)2 − 1 (73)
= τ(2 + τ), (74)
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with s = NS/
(√
NS(NS + 1)−NS
)
[37] and
τ ≡ 2κ2 (1 +NS)
(
NS√
NS(1 +NS)
)2m
. (75)
Combining (69) and (72), we obtain the following expres-
sion for the approximation error:
1
2
‖ρm − θNS‖1 ≤ ε =
1
2
√
τ(2 + τ). (76)
We can then invoke [38, Proposition 27], which utilizes
some techniques from [43], to obtain
f(ε,NS) = ε (2t+ rε(t)) g(P/εt)
+ 2g(εrε(t)) + 2h(εt), (77)
for any t ∈ (0, 12ε ], where
rε(t) = (1 + t/2)/(1− εt), (78)
P = 107, (79)
g(N) = (N + 1) log2(N + 1)−N log2(N), (80)
h(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x). (81)
In the above, we have set P = 107, which is an ex-
tremely conservative choice to employ with respect to
the fourth assumption on Eve’s attack discussed in Sec-
tion III. We have also supposed that Eve’s system is a
harmonic oscillator. Even though the mean photon num-
ber of the average input state in all example cases that
we consider in what follows is many orders of magnitude
smaller than P = 107 and the actual physical channel
being employed is a pure-loss channel, we can still sup-
pose that the mean energy of the eavesdropper’s states
is extremely large (way beyond what an eavesdropper
might reasonably employ in an attack) and we find that
the performance of the discrete-modulation protocols ap-
proaches that of the Gaussian-modulation protocol rel-
atively quickly as the constellation size m2 increases.
One could choose an even more conservative value for
P , higher than what we have taken. However, in our
numerics, we have found the same qualitative behavior:
that the performance of the discrete-modulation proto-
col rapidly approaches that of the Gaussian-modulation
protocol as the constellation size m2 increases.
With all these ingredients in hand, we can now nu-
merically evaluate (36) to obtain a lower bound on the
secret-key rate for a pure-loss channel with transmissiv-
ity η. We take the reconciliation efficiency β = 0.98.
Note that the key rates obtained from (36) have a de-
pendence on the mean photon number NS of the input
state. Thus, to obtain tight lower bounds on the secret-
key rate, we also optimize over NS .
In Figure 1, we present the main results of our analy-
sis. We plot lower bounds for various values of m2 and
compare the obtained lower bounds with the Gaussian-
modulation protocol. It is clear that the secure key rate
of the discrete-modulation protocol increases as the con-
stellation size m2 increases.
As explained before, to obtain the lower bound on the
rates given in Figure 1, we optimize over the mean pho-
ton number NS . For the Gaussian-modulation protocol,
we find that the optimal variance for secret-key rates de-
creases with the increase in loss. Now, the main idea be-
hind the technique presented in this paper is to discretize
the Gaussian probability distribution by a finite constel-
lation of size m2 and calculate the error introduced due
to this approximation. We find that as the variance of the
Gaussian modulation increases, the number of constella-
tion points required to approximate the distribution to
an ε error increases. Therefore, for low losses, this tech-
nique requires a large number m2 of constellation points
to closely match the secret key-rates obtained with Gaus-
sian modulation.
A consequence of the aforementioned reasoning is that,
with our approach, the lower bound on the secret-key
rate does not tend to logm2 in the limit as η → 1.
Certainly, in this limit, the Holevo information with
Eve tends to zero, and the key rate is then given as
K ≥ I(X;Y ) − f(ε,N ′S). We numerically observe that
the Shannon mutual information of Alice and Bob satu-
rates towards logm2 with the increase in variance; how-
ever, the approximation error f(ε,N ′S) increases with the
increase in variance. Due to this trade-off, our technique
does not achieve the ideal rate of logm2 rate in the low-
loss limit.
It is possible (and likely) that our rate lower bounds
can be improved by other constellation choices or other
proof techniques. However, even with our proof, requir-
ing a pair of electro-optic (phase and amplitude) modu-
lators to generate a 90×90 size constellation size is much
more practical and less demanding compared to asking
that we modulate a pulse with a complex amplitude to an
extremely high floating point accuracy, which a Gaussian
modulation would need.
We note here that we have included in the arXiv post-
ing of this paper the Mathematica files used to perform
the numerical calculation of the key rates and to gener-
ate Figure 1. We also note here that a similar approach
can be used to evaluate secure key rates achievable over
a thermal bosonic Gaussian channel.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have addressed a long-standing open
problem in continuous-variable quantum key distribution
(CV-QKD), by establishing a security proof for discrete-
modulation protocols. Even though many experiments
have been performed on discrete-modulation CV-QKD
with multiple constellation points (see, e.g., [56–58]), no
security proofs have been available for them, and the
expected key-rate calculations reported based on mea-
sured homodyne statistics have been based on assuming
Gaussian attacks, which are not known to be optimal
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for discrete-modulation CV-QKD. We have introduced
a discrete-modulation protocol and then obtained rigor-
ous lower bounds on the secret-key rates, secure against
collective attacks in the asymptotic key-length regime.
The approach that we have used works well in the high-
loss regime, with the secure key rates being close to the
secure key rates achievable with a Gaussian-modulation
protocol. Another prominent feature of our approach is
that with the increase in the size m2 of the constella-
tion, the lower bound on the secret-key rate approaches
the key rate for the Gaussian-modulation protocol. This
result demonstrates that we need not consider the full
continuum of the Gaussian distribution in order to ob-
tain key rates achievable with a Gaussian modulation,
and we do not need to rely on Gaussian modulation for
security proofs of discrete-modulation CV-QKD proto-
cols.
Going forward from here, it is a pressing open ques-
tion to determine security proofs for discrete-modulation
CV-QKD protocols in the non-asymptotic, or finite key-
length, regime. It would also be ideal to improve the
bound from Proposition 1 to reduce or eliminate its de-
pendence on the parameters c1 and c2.
Note Added : After the first version of our paper was
posted to the arXiv [59], the first version of the GGDL19
paper [60] appeared, which discussed a semi-definite pro-
gramming approach for security of a four-state discrete-
modulation CV-QKD protocol. The GGDL19 approach
was later extended to include discrete-modulation CV-
QKD protocols that have an arbitrary number of states,
at the expense of an increased complexity of the semi-
definite program [61, 62]. The second version of our pa-
per (this version) was then posted to include more details
of the channel estimation part of our protocol and secu-
rity proof. In light of the fact that our approach gives a
security proof and good performance for large constella-
tion sizes and the approach of GGDL19 gives the same
for small constellation sizes, we view our approach and
the GGDL19 one as being complementary.
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A. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
In this appendix, we provide a proof of Proposition 1. We first restate it here for convenience.
Proposition 2 Let ρ =
∑
x rX(x) |αx〉〈αx|, where
αx =
qA + ipA√
2
, (82)
rX(x) = rQA(qA) rPA(pA), (83)
θNS =
∫
dx rGX(x) |αx〉〈αx| , (84)
and rG(x) is the P -function of a thermal state with mean photon number NS. If
√
χ2(ρ, θ(NS)) ≤ ε2, and Eve’s
attacks fulfill the constraints in Section III, then
γ11 = γ
G
11, (85)
|γ22 − γG22| ≤ ε1, (86)
|γ12 − γG12| ≤ ε2, (87)
where
ε1 = ε · (1 + c1) ·
√
E [(QB − E[QB ])4], (88)
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ε2 = ε · (1 + c2) ·
√
E [(QA − E[QA])2(QB − E[QB ])2], (89)
for some constants c1, c2 > 0.
Proof. For simplicity, we prove the claim under the assumption that all random variables have zero mean, and we
note that it can be generalized by adopting a shift of the variables involved in the proof.
To prove the equality in (85), consider the following: γ11 is equal to the variance of the position quadrature that
is encoded by Alice during the preparation procedure. Since we are using the Gauss-Hermite approximation of the
Gaussian for the encoding, for which the lower moments match those of the Gaussian distribution, it follows that
γ11 = γ
G
11.
Due to the multiplicativity of the quantity χ2(ρ, σ) + 1, so that
χ2(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2, σ1 ⊗ σ2) + 1 = (χ2(ρ1, σ1) + 1)(χ2(ρ2, σ2) + 1), (90)
and the fact that [37]
χ2(ρ, θ(NS)) + 1 = (χ
2(rQA , r
G
QA) + 1)(χ
2(rQB , r
G
QB ) + 1), (91)
it follows that
χ2(ρ, θ(NS)) = χ
2(rQA × rQB , rGQA × rGQB ) = χ2(rX , rGX), (92)
which means that ∥∥rX − rGX∥∥1 ≤√χ2(rX , rGX) ≤ ε2. (93)
To prove the inequality in (86), observe that
‖ρ− θ(NS)‖1 ≤
√
χ2(ρ, θ(NS)) ≤ ε2, (94)
implies that
‖N (ρ)−N (θ(NS))‖1 ≤ ε2. (95)
The second inequality follows from data processing. Now consider
rQB (qB) =
∫ ∫
dx dpB W
N ,αx(qB , pB)rX(x), (96)
rGQB (qB) =
∫ ∫
dx dpB W
N ,αx(qB , pB)rGX(x), (97)
where WN ,αx is the associated Wigner function for the state resulting from transmitting a coherent state over the
channel N . Let rQB |X(qB |x) =
∫
dpBW
N ,αx(qB , pB), be the probability distribution obtained over the position
quadrature when the coherent state αx is sent over a channel N . Then we have the following:∫
dqB
∣∣rQB (qB)− rGQB (qB)∣∣ ≤ ∫ ∫ dx dqB ∣∣rX(x)rQB |X(qB |x)− rGX(x)rQB |X(qB |x)∣∣ (98)
=
∥∥rX − rGX∥∥1 ≤ ε2, (99)
which is a consequence of monotonicity of trace distance and (94).
Then we obtain the following:
|γG22 − γ22| =
∣∣∣∣∫ dqB rGQB (qB) |qB |2 − ∫ dqB rQB (qB) |qB |2∣∣∣∣ (100)
=
∣∣∣∣∫ dqB [rGQB (qB)− rQB (qB)] |qB |2∣∣∣∣ (101)
=
∣∣∣∣∫ dqB [√rGQB (qB)√rGQB (qB)−√rGQB (qB)√rQB (qB) +√rGQB (qB)√rQB (qB)−√rQB (qB)√rQB (qB)] |qB |2∣∣∣∣
(102)
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≤
∫
dqB
∣∣∣∣√rGQB (qB)−√rQB (qB)∣∣∣∣ √rGQB (qB) |qB |2 + ∫ dqB ∣∣∣∣√rGQB (qB)−√rQB (qB)∣∣∣∣ √rQB (qB) |qB |2 (103)
≤
√∫
dqB
∣∣∣∣√rGQB (qB)−√rQB (qB)∣∣∣∣2 ∫ dqB rGQB (qB) |qB |4
+
√∫
dqB
∣∣∣∣√rGQB (qB)−√rQB (qB)∣∣∣∣2 ∫ dqB rQB (qB) |qB |4 (104)
=
√∫
dqB
∣∣∣∣√rGQB (qB)−√rQB (qB)∣∣∣∣2
(√∫
dqB rGQB (qB) |qB |
4
+
√∫
dqB rQB (qB) |qB |4
)
. (105)
Now using that
√∫
dqB
∣∣∣√rGQB (qB)−√rQB (qB)∣∣∣2 is the Hellinger divergence and less than the square root of the
total variation distance
∫
dqB
∣∣rGQB (qB)− rQB (qB)∣∣, we obtain that∣∣∣∣∫ dqB rGQB (qB) |qB |2 − ∫ dqB rQB (qB) |qB |2∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε ·
(√∫
dqB rGQB (qB) |qB |
4
+
√∫
dqB rQB (qB) |qB |4
)
. (106)
To bound the second term we invoke the assumption that the photon number variance of the channel output is
bounded. Therefore,
Tr(nˆ2ρ) = Tr
(
(qˆ2B + pˆ
2
B − 1)2ρ
)
(107)
= Tr
(
(qˆ4B + pˆ
4
B + 1− 2qˆ2B − 2pˆ2B + 2qˆ2B pˆ2B)ρ
)
<∞, (108)
where ρ = N (θ(NS)). We thus conclude that
√∫
dqB rGQB (qB) |qB |
4
is also bounded, so that
√∫
dqB rGQB (qB) |qB |
4 ≤
c1 ·
√∫
dqB rQB (qB) |qB |4, for some constant c1 > 0.
To prove the inequality in (87), observe the following:
rQA,QB (qA, qB) =
∫
dpA rQB |QA,PA(qB |qA, pA)rQA(qA)rPA(pA), (109)
rGQA,QB (qA, qB) =
∫
dpA rQB |QA,PA(qB |qA, pA)rGQA(qA)rGPA(pA), (110)
where r(qB |qA, pA) =
∫
dpBW
N ,αqA,pA (pB , qB), and rQA,PA(qA, pA) = rQA(qA)rPA(pA). Then,∫
dqAdqB
∣∣rQA,QB (qA, qB)− rGQA,QB (qA, qB)∣∣ (111)
≤
∫
dqA dqB dpA
∣∣rQB |QA,PA(qB |qA, pA)rQA(qA)rPA(pA)− rQB |QA,PA(qB |qA, pA)rGQA(qA)rGPA(pA)∣∣ (112)
=
∥∥rQA × rPA − rGQA × rGPA∥∥1 ≤ ε2. (113)
By similar reasoning as above, we arrive at
|γ12 − γG12|
=
∣∣∣∣∫ dqA dqB rQA(qA)rQB |QA(qA|qB) qAqB − ∫ dqAdqB rGQA(qA)rGQB |QA(qB |qA) qAqB∣∣∣∣
≤
√∫ ∫
dqA dqB
∣∣∣√rQA(qA)rQB |QA(qB |qA)−√rGQA(qA)rGQB |QA(qB |qA)∣∣∣2×(√∫ ∫
dqAdqB rQA(qA)rQB |QA(qB |qA) |qA|2 |qB |2 +
√∫ ∫
dqAdqB rGQA(qA)r
G
QB |QA(qB |qA) |qA|
2 |qB |2
)
(114)
16
≤ ε ·
(√∫ ∫
dqAdqB rQA(qA)rQB |QA(qB |qA) |qA|2 |qB |2 +
√∫ ∫
dqAdqB rGQA(qA)r
G
QB |QA(qB |qA) |qA|
2 |qB |2
)
(115)
Then, invoking the assumption that the fourth moments of qA and qB are bounded, we obtain that the sec-
ond term in the above equation is bounded, such that
√∫ ∫
dqAdqB rGQA(qA)r
G
QB |QA(qB |qA) |qA|
2 |qB |2 ≤ c2 ·√∫ ∫
dqAdqB rQA(qA)rQB |QA(qB |qA) |qA|2 |qB |2, for some constant c2 > 0.
B. CHANNEL SYMMETRIZATION
We now show that by performing a discrete phase symmetrization in Steps 2-3 of the key distribution protocol from
Section II, it is possible to simplify the form of the covariance matrix of the state that Alice and Bob share at the
end of the EB protocol to a symmetrized form.
Let NA→B be a single-mode bosonic channel. Alice and Bob can make this channel phase covariant by applying
a random phase rotation and its inverse at the channel input and output, respectively, resulting in the following
symmetrized channel:
NA→B(ρA) = 1
4
3∑
k=0
einˆBpik/2NA→B(e−inˆApik/2ρAeinˆApik/2)e−inˆBpik/2. (116)
If the state input to the phase randomized channel is one share of a two-mode squeezed vacuum ψ(n¯)RA =
|ψ(n¯)〉〈ψ(n¯)|RA, defined from
|ψ(n¯)〉RA ≡ 1√
n¯+ 1
∞∑
n=0
√(
n¯
n¯+ 1
)n
|n〉R ⊗ |n〉A, (117)
then it follows that
NA→B(ψ(n¯)RA) = 1
4
3∑
k=0
(
e−inˆRpik/2 ⊗ einˆBpik/2
)
NA→B(ψ(n¯)RA)
(
einˆRpik/2 ⊗ e−inˆBpik/2
)
, (118)
where we have applied the fact that
e−inˆApik/2|ψ(n¯)〉RA = e−inˆRpik/2|ψ(n¯)〉RA. (119)
We would now like to determine the covariance matrix elements of the phase-randomized state τRB ≡ NA→B(ψ(n¯)RA):
2
〈
xˆ2R
〉
τ
〈{xˆR, pˆR}〉τ 〈{xˆR, xˆB}〉τ 〈{xˆR, pˆB}〉τ
〈{xˆR, pˆR}〉τ 2
〈
pˆ2R
〉
τ
〈{pˆR, xˆB}〉τ 〈{pˆR, pˆB}〉τ
〈{xˆR, xˆB}〉τ 〈{pˆR, xˆB}〉τ 2
〈
xˆ2B
〉
τ
〈{xˆB , pˆB}〉τ
〈{xˆR, pˆB}〉τ 〈{pˆR, pˆB}〉τ 〈{xˆB , pˆB}〉τ 2
〈
pˆ2B
〉
τ
 , (120)
where we assume for simplicity that τRB has zero mean, but we note here that the more general case can be incorpo-
rated by a shift. Given an initial covariance matrix with elements
σ =
σ11 σ12 σ13 σ14σ12 σ22 σ23 σ24σ13 σ23 σ33 σ34
σ14 σ24 σ34 σ44
 , (121)
the phase rotation e−inˆRφ ⊗ einˆBφ corresponds to the following symplectic transformation
X(φ) =
 cos(φ) sin(φ) 0 0− sin(φ) cos(φ) 0 00 0 cos(φ) − sin(φ)
0 0 sin(φ) cos(φ)
 . (122)
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So then calculating covariance matrix for the phase randomized state, it is given by
1
4
3∑
k=0
X(pik/2)σXT(pik/2), (123)
and we find that it is equal to
1
2
σ11 + σ22 0 σ13 − σ24 σ14 + σ230 σ11 + σ22 σ14 + σ23 − (σ13 − σ24)σ13 − σ24 σ14 + σ23 σ33 + σ44 0
σ14 + σ23 − (σ13 − σ24) 0 σ33 + σ44
 . (124)
The latter has the following form:  a 0 c2 c10 a c1 −c2c2 c1 b 0
c1 −c2 0 b
 , (125)
for a, b ≥ 1 and c1, c2 ∈ R. We can write this in the form of Eq. (D34) in [19] by setting c1 = z sin(θ) and c2 = z cos(θ),
so that z =
√
c21 + c
2
2 and θ = arctan(c1/c2), so that the form becomes a 0 z cos(θ) z sin(θ)0 a z sin(θ) −z cos(θ)z cos(θ) z sin(θ) b 0
z sin(θ) −z cos(θ) 0 b
 = [ aI2 z R(θ)z R(θ) bI2
]
. (126)
This completes the symmetrization of the covariance matrix due to the discrete phase randomization.
Ideally, we would estimate all the elements of the covariance matrix in the channel estimation step of the protocol.
However, it is much simpler to estimate only the parameters a, b, and z cos(θ), and assume instead that the covariance
matrix has the following form:  a 0 z cos(θ) 00 a 0 −z cos(θ)z cos(θ) 0 b 0
0 −z cos(θ) 0 b
 . (127)
That is, we ignore all correlations between position and momentum quadratures. The effect of doing so is to under-
estimate the correlations that are present in the state τRB . Therefore, this intuitively means we overestimate Eve’s
Holevo information during the channel estimation phase, and exhaustive numerical checks confirm that Eve’s Holevo
information is larger when replacing z with z cos(θ) (as was reported in [19]). Since we overestimate the Holevo infor-
mation, the security of the protocol is not compromised, but it is only the final key rate that is potentially reduced.
For additional discussion, see Appendix D of [19].
